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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3479 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
HAROLD SIDNEY BRUNSON 
a/k/a SID, a/k/a SHAWN JOHNSON 
 
Harold Sidney Brunson, 
Appellant                         
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-07-cr-00625-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 21, 2013)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendant Harold Brunson was charged in a 14-count indictment with committing 
seven armed robberies.  Counts 13 and 14, which related to the seventh robbery, were 
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severed and tried first, and Brunson was convicted on these two counts.  The District 
Court thereafter admitted evidence of this robbery at Brunson’s trial for the remaining six 
robberies.  Brunson appeals both the District Court’s admission of this evidence and its 
decision to try Counts 1-12 in a single trial.  In addition, Brunson contends that his 
conviction should be overturned because of prosecutorial misconduct.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm.   
I. 
Because we write solely for the parties, we recount only those facts essential to 
our decision.  All seven of the armed robberies Brunson was charged with committing 
bore several similarities.  Three of the robberies were committed in August 2006, and 
four were committed in August 2007.  All of the robberies occurred at small businesses in 
the same area of Northeast Philadelphia.  All seven were committed by two men.  Most 
of the victims described one man as taller with dark skin, and the other (Brunson) as 
shorter with comparatively lighter skin.  Finally, in six of the seven robberies, both men 
brandished guns.  One of the guns was consistently described as a small, silver handgun, 
and the other gun was described as a larger, black handgun.   
For each robbery, Brunson was charged with one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and one count of using and carrying a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  (Appendix
1
 42.)  
The District Court severed the counts by robbery and held that in proving each robbery, 
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 This opinion will refer to the Appendix as “A.”, and the Supplemental Appendix as 
“S.A.” 
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the government could not use evidence of the other six robberies.  The Court then 
presided over two trials.  The first trial was for the seventh robbery, and the second trial 
was for the fifth.  Both resulted in convictions.  Brunson, however, was granted a new 
trial for the fifth robbery, and as discussed infra, that robbery was ultimately tried with 
robberies 1-4 and 6.   
The District Court’s jury instructions in the second trial failed to articulate each 
element of the charged offenses.  As a result, the government requested a writ of 
mandamus to direct the District Court to provide correct instructions in future trials.  This 
Court granted the writ.  In addition, it directed that the case be reassigned and that the 
newly assigned judge revisit the previous Court’s evidentiary rulings and decision to 
sever the cases.  United States v. Brunson, 416 F. App’x. 212 (3d Cir. 2011).     
As directed, the case was reassigned.  Brunson then filed a motion for a new trial 
for the fifth robbery, which the District Court granted.  In addition, the government filed 
a motion in limine requesting that all of the remaining counts be tried in one case and that 
in that trial, the Court admit evidence of the seventh robbery.  The District Court granted 
the government’s motion, explaining that based on its review of the record, there was no 
unfair prejudice to the Defendant in trying all of the offenses in a single trial.  The 
District Court admitted evidence of the seventh robbery under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b), reasoning that the evidence was relevant and for a proper evidentiary purpose, as 
Brunson’s participation in the seventh robbery served as proof of his identity and a 
common plan.  Finally, the District Court admitted evidence of Brunson’s gun possession 
as evidence “intrinsic” to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offenses.  Brunson now appeals.   
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II.
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a. Severance 
 Brunson contends that it was error for the District Court to try all of his offenses in 
a single trial because the jury was unable to compartmentalize the different robberies due 
to the complexity of the case. 
This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for severance for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).  A district court 
should grant severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a 
defendant’s trial rights or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or 
innocence.  United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005).  Defendants face a 
“heavy burden” in establishing an abuse of discretion—they must prove a “clear and 
substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.”  United States v. Reicherter, 
647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981).  Mere allegations of prejudice are insufficient, and 
“defendants are not entitled to severance simply because they have a better chance of 
acquittal in separate trials.”  Urban, 404 F.3d at 775 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
  Brunson does not meet this burden.  Contrary to his assertion, nothing about this 
case was complex—it involved six straightforward armed robbery charges.  Moreover, 
the District Court expressly instructed the jury to compartmentalize the evidence, 
explaining “[t]he number of the offenses charged is not any evidence of guilt, and should 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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not influence your decision in any way.  You must separately consider the evidence that 
related to each offense, and you must return a separate verdict for each offense.”  (A. 
1135.)  We presume that the “jury follows such instructions and regard such instructions 
as persuasive evidence that refusals to sever did not prejudice the defendant.”  Urban, 
404 F.3d at 776 (internal citations omitted).  As such, we find no abuse of discretion in 
the District Court’s decision not to sever Brunson’s offenses and will affirm this aspect of 
the District Court’s order.        
b. Evidence of Wrongful Acts 
 This Court reviews a district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389 (3d Cir. 2012).  Evidence of 
other wrongful acts may be admitted as either “intrinsic” or “extrinsic” to the charged 
offense.  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2010).  Intrinsic evidence 
includes (1) evidence that directly proves the charged offense and (2) uncharged acts 
performed contemporaneously with the charged crime if the acts facilitated the 
commission of the charged crime.  Id. at 248-49.  Intrinsic evidence does not need to be 
analyzed under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Id. at 245.    
 By contrast, extrinsic evidence must be analyzed under Rule 404(b).  To be 
admissible under Rule 404(b), the prosecutor must provide reasonable notice of the 
evidence he intends to offer at trial, and the evidence must (1) have a proper evidentiary 
purpose, (2) be relevant, (3) satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and (4) be 
accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the 
jury may consider it.  Id. at 249. 
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 Here, the District Court concluded that evidence of Brunson’s seventh robbery 
was extrinsic to the charged offenses and admitted it under Rule 404(b), explaining that 
Brunson’s participation in the robbery served as proof of his identity and a common plan.  
(S.A. 2-4.)  By contrast, the District Court determined that evidence of Brunson’s gun 
possession was intrinsic to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offenses and admitted the evidence on 
that basis.  (S.A. 2-3.)  Brunson only challenges the District Court’s Rule 404(b) analysis.  
The thrust of Brunson’s argument is that the robberies were not similar, and thus, 
evidence of his seventh robbery and gun possession was nothing more than propensity 
evidence.  Brunson also asserts that the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighs its 
probative value and that the District Court’s limiting instructions were deficient.   
 We have reviewed the record and the District Court’s well-reasoned opinion and 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
seventh robbery or Brunson’s gun possession.  We find no merit to Brunson’s contention 
that the robberies were not similar and thus agree that evidence of the seventh robbery 
served as proof of Brunson’s identity and a common plan.  Moreover, the District Court 
explicitly instructed the jury—both when the evidence was introduced (A. 423-34) and at 
the conclusion of trial (A. 1151-52)—not to consider the seventh robbery as evidence of 
Brunson’s propensity to commit other crimes, thus mitigating any prejudice.  Finally, we 
agree with the District Court that evidence of Brunson’s gun possession was intrinsic to 
the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charges, as § 924(c) requires the government to prove that 
Brunson possessed a firearm.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 857, 860 
(3d Cir. 1982) (admitting witness testimony that witness had seen defendant with a gun to 
7 
 
prove defendant’s opportunity to commit armed robbery).  As such, we will affirm this 
aspect of the District Court’s order. 
c. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Brunson argues that his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct by making inflammatory and inappropriate statements in his 
closing remarks.  Specifically, Brunson contends that the government referred to Brunson 
as a liar, vouched for its witnesses’ credibility, and made statements not supported by the 
record.  Brunson did not raise these objections at trial and thus must demonstrate that 
admission of these statements constituted clear error.  United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 
259, 263 (3d Cir. 2004).  We have reviewed the prosecutor’s closing statement in its 
entirety, paying particular attention to Defendant’s citations, and find that under either an 
abuse of discretion or plain error standard, there is no merit to Defendant’s claim.  Thus, 
we will deny Defendant’s request for a new trial. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court and 
Brunson’s conviction. 
 
